Asia private markets investors adjust to more volatile, polarised macro conditions
Trying to predict macroeconomic developments doesn’t always justify mindshare devoted to the task, according to Vishal Mahadevia, a managing director and head of Asia private equity at Warburg Pincus.
The firm devotes considerable time to thinking about how external factors may tilt risk-reward parameters for any given investment. Ultimately, though, it’s about finding companies resilient enough to withstand external shocks, so investors can ignore background noise during a five-year holding period and focus on building better products and market share.
“Volatility is part of the world we live in,” Mahadevia explained. “If someone says, ‘Let’s wait to do something because things will be better in three months,’ I wouldn’t subscribe to that. You have to accept conditions as they are, invest, and make sure you can generate returns.”
It gives context to anecdotal observations that Asia’s private equity industry remains firmly in deployment mode even as the world around it distorts. Most recently, concerns about overly aggressive artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure buildout – and how this capital expenditure will be funded – have roiled public markets, sending stocks like AMD, Iren and Alphabet into freefall in early November.
Andrew Crook, a partner at Clifford Chance, notes that investors are stepping back from AI tangential businesses, having seen hyperscaler spending projections turn from tailwinds into headwinds. But this isn’t likely to descend into widespread disengagement.
“We aren’t seeing the swings in investment activity we saw at the beginning of COVID, when PE houses could pull a transaction in response to oil prices going above USD 100 per barrel and the resulting equity market volatility,” he said.
“There are many explanations for this, but a lot of it could be a change in how investors instinctively react to risk and volatility. Investors have been conditioned by the events of 2020 through 2023, from COVID to interest rates to supply chain disruptions. Macro today doesn’t seem as scary as if it had happened in 2018.”
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Whether driven by resilience or necessity – portfolio turnover has been slow in recent years – this willingness to transact is being tested by unprecedented levels of uncertainty. AI-related instability comes on the back of tariff tantrums, fuel supply bottlenecks connected to conflict in the Middle East, rising inflation, and ongoing geopolitical tensions between China and the US.
Sovereignty is a prominent theme across the region as governments prioritise energy, supply chain and data security. Regulation looms large over perceived critical assets, most clearly evidenced by China and Japan mobilising tougher investment oversight regimes in the past 12 months. The challenge for private equity is finding opportunities amid the landmines.
“There’s so much dislocation, so much volatility, rates are going to be higher for longer,” said Xuong Liu, a managing director in the global transaction advisory group at Alvarez & Marsal.
“But all this is happening against a backdrop of record levels of dry powder and a protracted period of muted exits and deployment. On one hand, we have volatility. On the other, we have fundamentals encouraging deal activity.”
Unavoidable AI
Asian private equity and venture capital has held up well in the face of uncertainty. Approximately USD 205bn has been deployed so far in 2026, already ensuring a third consecutive annual increase, according to AVCJ Research. The USD 226bn posted in 2022 might even be within reach.
However, this has been driven by a surge in growth-stage activity with an unmistakable AI edge. Around USD 34bn has been ploughed into AI-related companies, more than the prior five years combined. The bulk of this was spread across four China-based large language model (LLM) specialists, but there is a long tail of app developers and robotics start-ups that exist in the same ecosystem.
The phenomenon isn’t limited to pure technology plays. While LLMs account for five of the 15 largest investments announced year to date, four more are data centre operators, including growth rounds for Australia’s Firmus Technologies and Singapore’s DayOne Data Centres at USD 10bn-plus valuations.
Both companies filed for IPOs in early October. Within weeks, as AI-linked selloffs rocked stock markets, Firmus pulled its offering and DayOne’s was put on hold. Other data centre operators did the same.
DayOne is targeting an Asia Pacific ex-China data centre market that will have 49 GW of capacity by 2030, up from 16 GW in 2025, its IPO prospectus states. Over the same period, the US is expected to rise from 37 GW to 105 GW as global capacity grows 2.5x to 225 GW.
Asia is very much part of the supply chain feeding this US-centric scaleup. According to Jason Thomas, head of global research and investment strategy at Carlyle, the AI-driven surge in US business spending in 3Q26 was accompanied by a surge in data centre hardware imports, mostly from Asia.
Taiwan posted a 14.4% year-on-year increase in GDP, nearly all linked to exports and capacity additions by TSMC, which supplies AI chips to the likes of Nvidia. South Korea saw a 200-basis-point boost in GDP thanks to memory chip exports, while Japan’s uptick came from the specialty electronic chemicals, equipment and critical components essential to AI hardware manufacturing.
“Relative to year-ago levels, AI-related exports added nearly one percentage point to Japan’s GDP, roughly the same magnitude as the AI impulse to Korean growth after accounting for the 2.3x differential in the size of these economies,” Thomas observed in a recent note, adding that AI spending had insulated East Asian economies from fuel price shocks connected to the Middle East conflict.
Risk assessment
Private equity investors that have leaned into the AI value chain through industrial technology plays could suffer from a sudden unwind of the US capex boom. But suggestions that exposure to volatility around the biggest of global megatrends – in a year littered with high-level uncertainties – should prompt meaningful change in the assessment of macro risk are given short shrift.
Advent International is typical in highlighting the bottom-up, asset-specific elements of investment decision making. While admitting that top-down macro factors such as currencies and commodity prices cannot be ignored, Shweta Jalan, a Mumbai-based managing partner at the firm, stressed that they “play a role in our assessment… they don’t dictate what we do in any country.”
Advisors that work on pre-deal due diligence point to change at the margins. Scenario analysis has become more rigorous, with Alvarez & Marsal’s Liu noting greater emphasis on quantifying input costs with and without external impacts like the Middle East conflict. Comfort in underwriting comes, in his view, from a perception that conditions will ultimately readjust.
Sebastien Lamy, co-head of Bain & Company’s Asia Pacific private equity practice, has seen a similarly systematic approach to thinking through various outcomes. Analysis of inflationary pressure, for example, would consider whether contracts are structured with cost pass-throughs and whether plans exist to mitigate labour shortages or rising wages.
“Following the interest rate hikes in 2022 and the tariffs last year, activity almost ground to a halt. Now, it seems as though GPs are approaching macro uncertainty with a view to isolating short-term noise. More attention is being given to preparing for the uncertain because they want to get a better feel for the bounds under different macroeconomic scenarios,” Lamy said.
The extent to which due diligence extends into the sovereignty domain depends on where investors choose to play. Many have responded to geoeconomic dislocation by doubling down on domestic consumption plays and avoiding sectors with significant government and regulatory exposure.
Warburg Pincus has concentrated on “the picks and shovels enabling the use of AI” rather than deep tech where geopolitics could be more of a problem, according to Mahadevia.
Alvarez & Marsal’s Liu added that most of his private equity clients focus on more benign areas of consumer, business services, and logistics. “If there are sensitivities, they tend to be one layer removed – not serving the chipmaker but the chip inspection business,” he said.
Data dynamics
Infrastructure investors, by contrast, sit on the frontline of policy debates. When Sonal Varma, chief economist for Asia ex-Japan at Nomura, describes a macro environment characterised by national emphasis on self-sufficiency, reducing import dependence, and eliminating strategic vulnerabilities, it is easy to see how these forces coalesce around data centres.
Concerns about how public markets perceive the sustainability of the capex cycle are overshadowed by questions around where to put capacity and provide power and water to keep it in operation. Data localisation requirements are seen as driving development opportunities across the region, with Southeast Asia, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand cited as active markets.
Khan Yow, a managing director at Seraya Partners, claims that latency and speed are the key factors when data centre operators choose locations, not sovereignty. However, if Japan is the first port of call for traffic entering Asia, geopolitics may influence how it moves on via subsea fibre networks.
Seraya owns Empyrion Digital, a pan-Asian data centre operator, and SPTel, a Singapore-based fibre network provider, as part of a broader next-generation infrastructure portfolio. It is not alone in highlighting increased scrutiny in this part of the AI value chain.
“There is more focus on who owns the data centre, where the funding comes from, and what hardware is used,” added Evan Hattersley, a managing director in the secure assets team at Pacific Equity Partners (PEP), which backed Ten Peaks earlier this year to meet New Zealand’s needs for onshore capacity.
“Questions are also asked about who the customers are. Certain US companies might not want to be collocated in facilities with groups seen as politically sensitive like Chinese state-owned enterprises.”
Within hardware, graphics processing units (GPUs) are the focal point, given how semiconductors have splintered into US-centric and China-centric ecosystems. For components unrelated to storage and communication, supply chains are less geographically polarised, and procurement is dictated by price and quality. This doesn’t mean they are necessarily straightforward.
“A lot of how we build our investment theses is based on geopolitics; we invest through geopolitics. We don’t invest directly in China – the infrastructure market is weighted towards state control – but the country is a massive player in infrastructure equipment, so we must evaluate that,” said Seraya’s Yow.
“At the same time, you can’t segment the world in such a clean way, as Chinese or Western. That’s one of our strengths as an Asia-focused investor, being able to navigate complexities across geopolitics.”
This extends from digital to energy infrastructure, where Yow flags misperceived Chinese dominance. First, an overwhelming global market share in renewables segments like solar modules and batteries obscures intense price-led competition between domestic players. Second, there are gaps in its coverage. For example, China has yet to replicate its success in wind turbines in gas turbines.
Security issues
Other investors with exposure to energy and industrials subscribe to a more bifurcated world view. Kyle Shaw, founder and managing partner of ShawKwei & Partners, argues that a disentangling of China and US supply chains is an inevitable consequence of regulatory pressure and tightening risk appetite. “Once you get on one network, that precludes you from getting on the other,” he said.
ShawKwei sees both sides of the energy trade: one of its investment strategies backs Asia-based advanced manufacturing businesses that rely on imported energy and oil byproducts; another provides services to petrochemicals companies, effectively moving in tandem with global infrastructure buildout.
The firm expects more investment in domestic generation and processing capacity across Asia after the Middle East conflict underscored the region’s reliance on crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) transported through the Strait of Hormuz. Industry participants also note a shift in policy tone.
“A lot of the time renewables were seen from a decarbonisation perspective. Now, it’s more about self-reliance and energy security. The concept of having power generation within your own borders is being pushed harder and renewables are a good fit, not importing more LNG or diesel,” said Seraya’s Yow.
However, renewables aren’t being positioned as a substitute for LNG. Rather, the emphasis is on diversifying sources and maximising supply. This is essential not only to contain external shocks that could check economic growth, but also to meet escalating energy demand linked to the AI value chain.
“Data centres are the big customers and they need baseload power. While intermittent renewables like solar and wind can help, they aren’t the full solution,” said Jason Cheng, CEO and managing partner of Kerogen Capital, which invests in traditional energy and decarbonisation assets globally.
“In the US, where data centre growth has been most rapid, most of the hyperscalers are signing deals for nuclear, geothermal and biomass. They are willing to fund less proven technologies as well.”
AI also looms large over Asia’s electricity transmission and distribution opportunity. In Southeast Asia alone, Bain & Company estimates 100 terawatt hours of new energy demand will come from data centres, electric vehicle infrastructure and green industrial parks between 2025 and 2030. The data centre contribution will be 35 TWh-45 TWh with announced capex of up to USD 130bn.
Antiquated grids are not equipped to handle the implied capacity nor is there sufficient for upgrades. Using 2024 levels as a guide, the annual grid investment shortfall through 2035 will be USD 18bn.
Here, as elsewhere in the region, opportunities are plentiful for investors able to navigate macro policy and the accompanying micro challenges presented by unclear regulation and execution bottlenecks.
Bigger picture
Henry McVey, KKR’s head of global macro and asset allocation, has referenced a blurring of geopolitics and economics as countries move from a low-cost, efficiency-first model towards one where redundancy, reliability and resilience matter more. Against this backdrop, more strategic geopolitical chokepoints and greater demand for critical AI inputs are a recipe for increased economic volatility.
Yet he wrote in October that the global investment cycle is broader and more durable than anticipated, albeit more inflationary as well. “AI is only one part of a much larger spending cycle that now includes defence, infrastructure, energy, and supply-chain resiliency,” McVey observed.
In Asia, the push to diversify energy sources is reminiscent of similar resilience-driven efforts regarding supply chains. On a broad level, both have contributed to a redrawing of trade and capital flows, with Nomura’s Varma highlighting the supremacy of “geopolitical alignment and market access.”
Bain & Company’s Lamy extends the comparison: one distinguishing feature of sovereignty in an Asian context is the opening and closing of different corridors. “Investors must assess the risks attached to losing or gaining access,” he said. “You can do China for China or India for India as a hedge against geoeconomic dislocation, but across trade, capital, and digital infrastructure, everything is changing.”
To varying degrees, the investor response to macro volatility involves a diversification of relationships – a consequence of commercial prudence, not just geopolitical necessity.
The merits of intra-Asia trade are emphasised as an antidote to difficulties on other cross-border axes. Mahadevia noted that Warburg Pincus is currently looking at a company that manufactures in one country but has customers spread across the region. “You don’t have to rely on one market for exports, whether that’s the US or somewhere else,” he added.
The Asia-Middle East corridor is also referenced more frequently, the Iran conflict notwithstanding. While there is a fundraising angle, some global private equity firms have demonstrated the scope for closer ties between the regions in part through their personnel decisions.
Brookfield already places them under a single umbrella, with Aditya Joshi, head of Asia Pacific and Middle East private equity, sitting in Dubai. He sees a natural connectivity born of the Middle East’s evolving global role from a target market for wealth products chiefly served by Europe to a business and investment hub with more logical ties to Asia.
“When it comes to investing in the Middle East, there is a proximity to Asia, not just from a geographical perspective, but from a language and culture perspective,” Joshi said.
EQT opened its Abu Dhabi office in September, with Jimmy Mahtani adding Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) chairman to his existing role as the private capital division’s chairman of India and Southeast Asia. Smiyet Belrhiti, who leads the new office as Middle East head, believes the region will retain its relevance as a bridge between Asia and the US and Europe.
“There’s been a lot of talk about infrastructure resiliency and de-risking from the Strait of Hormuz. Will that completely dislocate supply chain routes? It’s too early to tell,” he said. “But based on the opportunities we’re seeing, many growing businesses will have a presence in the GCC and Asia.”