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Adams Street Partners’ Jeff Diehl on outlook for liquidity, navigating volatility

Jeff Diehl is a managing partner and head of investments at Adams Street Partners, holding responsibility for investment activity the overall management of the firm. He joined the firm in 2000 from US based strategy consulting and principal investing business Parthenon Group. Adams Street manages USD 76bn in assets across primary fund investment, co-investment, secondaries, private credit, and venture growth strategies.

Q: Have liquidity conditions improved for private equity globally? 

A: The liquidity we’ve generated as a percentage of beginning NAV [net asset value] in our primary portfolio has averaged 21%-22% since 1980. There were dips after the internet bubble and the GFC [global financial crisis], but latest is one of the longest we’ve seen, nearly five years. Now, we are seeing a meaningful pickup in deal pipelines, which is usually a good sign in terms of companies going to market for change of control transactions. The real hope is that the IPO market can return as the bigger companies get out. SpaceX already went out, Anthropic is on file, I would expect OpenAI to follow. And there’s a host of companies in the venture-backed space that are picking up.

Q: That handful of very large offerings won’t soak up all the demand? 

A: The dynamic is the same almost every time. When the window closes, it’s usually because some marginal companies go public, underperform on their fundamentals, after market trading is bad, and the buyers who got burned have memories that last for a while. At some point private company quality goes up, and at this point the bar for revenue and growth is high, so some bellwethers go through and open the window. If they trade well and company fundamentals continues, the buyers of those IPOs want more, order books go up in size, price per share rises, and the next wave of companies comes. Eventually you get the lower quality companies again because the bar keeps dropping. We’ve been closed for five years, so there’s a large group of companies that would already be public in a normal environment. I think a lot of high-quality companies can follow the big few.

Q: Isn’t there a huge performance disparity between managers that have exposure to Anthropic and those that do not? 

A: We’ve had close to 14,000 venture-backed company exits, and the top 7% have produced 100% of the net gains for clients. This doesn’t mean the other 93% are losers, it just means there are winners and losers that offset each other. To get in that club, you’ve got to be a 6x-plus money multiple. Outliers do drive performance, so getting into those rocket-ship-revenue companies – not just Anthropic and OpenAI, there’s a host of them – is critical to getting outsize returns. And of course, the dispersion of manager performance in terms of top, median and bottom quartile is wider in venture capital than in any other asset class. These marks are still largely unrealised at this point, but I do think we will see the dispersion widen again as outlier companies that can compound revenue growth at high rates not just get up rounds but also generate liquidity for investors.

Q: What points to a pickup in trade sale activity as well? 

A: We’re already seeing some interesting acquisitions – for example, Salesforce has been active, looking for ways to grow. Strategic M&A picks up partly because people expect a healthy IPO market. It is much easier to buy a company when it’s private. Once it’s public, there’s an obligation to sell to the bidder that offers maximum shareholder value with the highest deal certainty.

Q: Are managers being forced to accept valuations below target levels for the sake of delivering near-term liquidity? 

A: Historically, we’ve seen a good exit pop from the last carrying value prior to running a process. The last four years have been muted, but when rates go up business values should go down. I don’t think there’s any question that when rates go up and the bid-ask between buyers and sellers widens, managers will want to take markdowns gradually even as business performance improves – to the point where they think they can sell for more than the carrying value. I do think we will see a pick-up in activity now that businesses have had the chance to grow into the valuations that investors paid or reach return territory that is interesting for the GP.

Q: If Salesforce is active, this suggests M&A is happening in the software space… 

A: The devil is in the detail. If you’re solving mission critical problems, you’re embedded in APIs [application programming interfaces] across the client base, then you’re difficult to rip out. AI could code your software, but good luck integrating it into workflows, taking risk off the client, and all those other things. Those companies will be strategic M&A targets and command good prices. If you’re in customer satisfaction software, you’re at real risk of disruption because you’re not deeply embedded ion anything. Those companies might get acquired, but not for good prices because there are real questions about terminal value.

Q: What’s been the impact of recent volatility around artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure? 

A: There’s always a risk of overbuild on the infrastructure side. We saw it with telecom infrastructure during the dotcom bubble – their projections regarding demand for internet traffic were wrong for a long time, perhaps because other VC-backed companies failed and didn’t contribute to that demand. Most of our portfolio on the VC side is companies that consume data centre capacity – because they deliver solutions to customer that drive productivity – and we are very excited by their revenue growth. There’s no doubt a lot of debt has been raised for data centres, so questions will be asked as to whether it’s too much or what the return on that capital will be. That story has yet to be told.

Q: Are managers getting better at underwriting macro risk? 

A: Processes usually get paused in response to macro events like the tariff tantrum and the Middle East conflict. While first-order effects might be easy to underwrite, second and third order effects are tougher. It’s not just are you impacted by tariffs, but what happens if one of your customers or one of their customers is impacted – what does that mean for buying behaviour? It’s the same for oil prices. But once a situation has been going on for a while, you should be able to underwrite investments where you’re clear about the industry problem being solved. People are going to have to get used to operating in an environment of macro and geopolitical uncertainty. Regarding elections, politics and investing rarely sit well. But if you sit out when you’re favoured party is out of power and go back when they’re in, you will miss a lot of investment opportunities. Private markets are ultimately about bottom-up company selection.

Q: Does a widening dispersion of returns pose an existential threat to some industry participants? 

A: When interest rates were zero, it invited a lot of activity. Fundraising was robust and everyone’s returns looked good. The buyout industry was producing 17% median returns for close to 15 years – you could just buy a company, hold it for five years, and do a 12% return without making any improvements. Those days are gone. We are back to basics. We are going to see a bifurcation between those who have been disciplined in their asset selection and those who have not. A lot of firms are still doing one-and-done closes, even in this environment. People recognise and reward quality, discipline, and good results. The less disciplined ones will struggle to raise funds of similar or larger size, and that has knock-on effects in terms of their ability to attract and retain people in the partnership.

It takes a long time for a private equity firm’s economics to dry up completely, but will we see groups fail to raise new funds and fade away? Yes, no question. We’ve seen it in prior cycles. Will there be a lot of M&A and sales of firms? It’s tough. We haven’t previously seen waves of that. We haven’t previously had large public alternatives firms with the need and desire to pursue continuous growth, although for the most part, they are diversifying investment capabilities rather than buying up businesses and slapping them together.