As governments and corporates grapple with AI infrastructure investment needs and rebuilding supply chains in a fractured world, reglobalisation is the watchword reshaping crossborder M&A.

The key question is whether geopolitical forces driving reglobalisation’s implied rupture from the post-Cold War settlement result in new networks of lasting international alliances and capital flows, or great power “spheres of influence” that are constantly policed by state actors.

While both present challenges and opportunities, a flight to resilience is the key marker of preparedness for any eventuality – and a central pillar of corporate and sponsor M&A strategies.

From private capital’s perspective, the shaking of the international kaleidoscope has revealed an unprecedented requirement for corporate capex across energy, digital, and industrial infrastructure that needs to be undertaken before the pieces settle, Scott Kleinman, Co-President of Apollo Asset Management, said at IPEM in Paris last month.

“We’ve spent the last forty years globalising the economy. We’re going to spend the next five-to-ten years reglobalising the economy,” Kleinman said.

M&A is already reflecting this realignment. Crossborder dealmaking in the first nine months of 2026 hit USD 1.2tn, with inbound M&A into the US up 4%, recording 1,109 transactions worth USD 295.5bn, according to Mergermarket data.

Yet it’s also important to be realistic when charting a new course for the future, with geopolitical shocks just as capable of throwing up barriers as creating opportunities.

Global political leaders are under pressure, with many facing critical upcoming polls, including the US midterms, and general elections in Israel, Spain and France.

Xiaomeng Lu, Director, Geo-technology at Eurasia Group argued that reglobalisation is an optimistic framing of regionalisation in this context. From a Chinese corporate perspective, efforts to rewire international partnerships in part reflect diminished access to the US and the pursuit of alternative territories in the hunt for growth.

Amid a “rapid shift in supply chains, moving away from the US”, many Asian countries are left wondering “are we going to have to pick a side?” Deborah Elms, Head of Trade Policy at the Hinrich Foundation said on a recent on a recent European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) webcast.

It may not be a top-down, directed effort, but “there will be a collective set of choices by companies and governments that will lead us to a new world order,” she said. “And if we are going to have the laws of the jungle,” Elms remarked, then actors will feel they “had best side with a predator or we will get eaten.”

David Henig, Director of the UK Trade Policy Project at ECIPE questioned in an interview with this news service whether these geopolitical forces at play can really be characterised as reglobalisation. It might be more appropriate to ask whether governments are simply acting as control centres, looking to block developments or invest in key areas, with corporates aligning, he argued.

Yet new partnerships are emerging across sectors and country specialisms that one might never have imagined in the past, Elms said. Sector M&A has become a tool for associated infrastructure build out, with record dealmaking across AI, technology and energy in 1H26.

“We can get to a world of interconnectivity,” Henig conceded. “But there will be continued trade frictions and trade wars along the way,” he predicted.

Indeed, as governments deepen strategic partnerships and tie industrial policy to national security objectives, some observers argue that the post-Cold War run of US-led economic integration is at risk of giving way to a modern version of “spheres of influence“, where investment, supply chains and technology ecosystems face barriers due to geopolitical alliances.

Corporate interest in strategic geographies is evident in Taiwan M&A shooting 2.2x higher in volume year-to-date – a 15-year record. Nvidia’s USD 3.5bn investment in Mediatek via convertible bonds and Taiwan battery storage manufacturer ProLogium’s merger with a US special purpose acquisition company for USD 3.9bn are two emblematic deals in this arena.

There was also a 20% increase in M&A targeting near-shoring hotspots Mexico and Poland – the latter seeing the fourth largest aggregate deal volume for inbound investment in Europe. Meanwhile, the UK benefitted from a 2x increase inbound investment as an entry point to Europe.

The old continent represents a key investment area for China, given those US market access issues across key sectors, Lu added.

Beijing may be keen to encourage corporate investment to win over European Union member states in case Sino-EU relations flare up, Lu argued. “If they get some approvals from individual states from Spain or Eastern Europe then this gives them more leverage in the negotiations.”

China’s relations with India may also soften after a near complete hiatus in investment between the two nations, Lu noted.

Rewiring or short-term fix?

The key question remains as to whether potential shifts in government agendas over the coming year will herald a true long-term shift to reglobalisation, or signal a rolling evolution of short-term regionalisation, dependent on who occupies 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, Zhongnanhai, or the 13th floor at Berlaymont.

A highly anticipated Democratic surge in the US midterms would certainly result in greater congressional scrutiny of President Donald Trump’s agenda. But absent a supermajority, Congress will struggle to find legislative routes to blocking presidential executive orders – Trump’s preferred mode of government – as he seeks to cement his legacy.

Both Liberation Day in 2025 and the Iran conflict earlier this year sidestepped congressional approval, leading to 7% and 29% falls in global M&A volume in subsequent quarters.

Still, Trump’s dealmaking appetite leaves open the possibility for some US alliances to develop.

Should right-wing scion Flávio Bolsonaro defeat Lula da Silva to the Brazilian presidency this weekend, it’s easy to imagine the country-level rapprochement that could follow.

And Sino-US tensions have softened of late after Trump and President Xi Jinping’s summit at the end of September, where they agreed to launch dialogue on AI, with further talks scheduled for November and their trade truce extended to 10 January, according to state media. Lu pointed out that short-term tariff relief and a regular meeting schedule provides the opportunity for further influence across the two parties.

Yet Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal to discuss negotiating the end of the war in Ukraine with the US and China – but without any input from President Zelensky or Europe – at next month’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit has raised further concerns that the broader direction of travel is more “spheres of influence” than rewired globalisation.

And the overarching consensus is that there is scope for volatility up to, and possibly beyond, the end of Trump’s second term. Trade experts argue that anger felt by Canada and Asian countries over tariffs and geopolitical turmoil may outlast the current administration. On top of this, digital and AI sovereignty priorities will continue, they said.

Security and resilience 

Of course, sovereignty is illusory without the means to defend it. The long road to achieving reglobalisation will mean “starting from defence infrastructure”, Apollo’s Kleinman said.

Defence M&A has hit record levels at USD 50bn YTD, led by transactions in the US and Germany.

Given the sensitive nature of the sector, there has been significant focus on joint ventures and partnerships as continents such as Europe seek to ensure military capabilities are secure and resilient, a defence-focused banker said.

Such thinking goes well beyond corporate footprints and into beneficial ownership, the banker said. “At what point does the cap structure need to reflect sovereignty?” they added.

Upcoming defence auctions such as Dutch drone detection player Robin Radar may be a barometer for this question of sovereignty amid shifting geopolitical alliances, especially around how open European companies and governments are to US investors in a cap table, the banker said.

For its part, the Ukrainian defence ecosystem is happily raising direct capital from US investors, the banker noted. London-based, Ukrainian-founded drone developer Uforce was reportedly aiming to raise USD 500m at a USD 5bn valuation led by Valor Equity Partners in September.

Funding rounds for defence tech start-ups have hit record sizes globally, shooting to an average of USD 104m this year compared to USD 67m in 2025.

With so much capital seeking exposure to the space, it’s unsurprising that industrial manufacturers are also actively seizing opportunities in this landscape, with many repurposing their output as defence OEMs grapple with record order backlogs.

Last month, Saab announced it had signed MoUs with SSC Space, OHB Sweden and Ericsson to strengthen sovereign Swedish and Nordic space capabilities focused on military applications.

Some might argue the rush to build defence capacity points to a future of geopolitical Darwinism, rather than reglobalisation. Others would say the postwar order rested on US military hegemony and institutions such as NATO that need reshaping for a changed world.

Whether we are just at the beginning of a lasting era of reglobalisation or enduring a short-termist cycle of regionalisation remains an open question. But the ongoing race for AI and defence infrastructure build out, alongside the hunt for resilience against potential trade shocks, will keep M&A at the forefront of executives, investors and politicians’ minds alike.