LIV Golf enters bankruptcy with RSA backed by BC Partners, DIP funding from majority owner – Case Profile
LIV Golf has filed its long-anticipated Chapter 11 cases, backed by a restructuring support agreement (RSA) with BC Partners Advisors and DIP financing from its equity owner, The Public Investment Fund of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (PIF).
The company, which describes itself as the world’s only global golf league, entered Chapter 11 protection on Tuesday afternoon (8 September) in the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey.
A prepetition marketing process led to the identification of a proposed lead investor, BC Partners, which expressed a willingness to fund a large portion of the financing needed to sponsor the 2027 season and beyond, contingent on the company consummating a reorganization plan. Per RSA milestones, LIV Golf has 35 days after the petition date to reach an RSA that includes BC Partners, PIF, and a requisite number of players in the league.
PIF has agreed to fund USD 49.6m in new money DIP financing. In addition to the new money, the DIP financing also includes a roll-up of prepetition debt.
The company
The initial corporate entities comprising LIV Golf were formed in the US, Jersey, and the UK beginning in June 2021. The organization launched operations in March 2022 after equity funding was received from entities controlled by PIF, which remains the ultimate equity owner of LIV Golf, according to a declaration from Chief Restructuring Officer David Orlofsky, of AlixPartners.
He said the debtors own and operate the world’s only global golf league, which features 13 teams, a 14-tournament schedule, and many of the world’s best golfers. The league was designed to expand golf on a global level and offer a “new and exciting alternative” to the PGA Tour and DP World Tour, Orlofsky noted. The established leagues have historically dominated the golf market.
Orlofsky said LIV Golf has engaged in innovation to set a new standard and redefine fans’ experience through the lens of music, culture, and entertainment, while growing the sport for a new era of players and fans. LIV Golf essentially sought to change the entire approach to how the game was played by golfers and viewed by fans. Initially, the LIV Golf format reduced the standard 72-hole tournament – four rounds of 18 – to 54 holes. In late 2025, LIV Golf changed its tournament format to increase the number of holes played to 72, based on players’ feedback. The goal was to get maximum Official World Golf Ranking points for playing in LIV Golf tournaments and to increase the number of opportunities for sponsors.
Gameplay was accelerated through “shotgun starts,” Orlofsky explained, where all players begin at the same time, at different holes throughout the course, reducing the average pace of play from 10-12 hours for a traditional golf tournament to only 4.5 hours for a LIV Golf tournament. LIV introduced a team concept, in which players compete both on an individual and team basis. That model offered more excitement for fans, according to Orlofsky, as well as a more condensed broadcast experience and new sponsorship and branding opportunities.
LIV Golf also added a festival-style atmosphere to tournaments, with extensive fan entertainment options, including celebrity appearances and concerts.
LIV Golf’s revenues are generated from (i) sponsorship, which accounted for about 49% of 2025 revenue, (ii) tournament hosting fees, which accounted for about 22% of 2025 revenue, (iii) ticketing and hospitality, which accounted for about 16% of 2025 revenue, (iv) broadcasting rights, which accounted for about 5% of 2025 revenue, (v) merchandise sales, which accounted for about 5% of 2025 revenue, and (vi) other revenue, including food and beverage commission and interest received, which accounted for the remaining 3% of 2025 revenue.
The debt
Until June of this year, LIV Golf funded operations solely through equity infusions of affiliated entities of PIF. As of the petition date, LIV Golf Investments, the ultimate parent, had issued over five billion preference shares and 421,500 class A ordinary shares, accounting for 98.48% common ownership, to PIF.
On 4 June, the company entered into a secured facility agreement with PIF as the lender. As of the petition date, the outstanding balance, including interest, is about USD 495m.
The descent
According to Orlofsky’s declaration, getting top-tier talent was an important aspect to developing a premier golf league. To establish itself as a serious contender, LIV Golf needed to find a way to recruit and retain high-performing golfers with fan recognition. That was a “high hurdle” in the face of anticompetitive opposition to LIV Golf by the established leagues, he noted.
Despite that, LIV Golf was successful in acquiring talent and now has one of the most impressive rosters of golfers within the sport, Orlofsky said. However, that success came at a significant cost – the only way to overcome the exclusionary practices by the traditional golf tours was to use structural changes to the way golfers are traditionally compensated. The established tours compensate their players largely through prize purses, while also requiring players to cover expenses like hotel and airfare for themselves and their support team. Further, players need to attract their own sponsors for personal branding. The established compensation model is almost entirely performance-based, which typically means players accrue thousands of dollars of out-of-pocket expenses that can only be recouped through winnings. Therefore, LIV Golf was forced to acquire top golfers through a combination of upfront payments and annual payments to cover the rights to sponsorship inventory. The team concept requires consistent uniforms, and so the teams were required to sell sponsorships for their own benefit and not for the benefit of one player. The annual payments compensated players for the lost earning potential from not being able to sell their own sponsorships.
Orlofsky said the league was successful in growing the game of golf globally, but it required significant investments to achieve a break-even balance sheet from PIF affiliates. Since LIV Golf’s inception in 2021, entities controlled by PIF have invested about USD 5bn in equity capital. While LIV Golf has had success over its five-year span of operations with strong revenue growth, sponsorship, attendance, ticketing, broadcast rights, and other economic metrics, it continually ran at an operational loss, according to Orlofsky. The league was still years away from projected stand-alone profitability based on its prior structure.
In April, PIF announced that the continued funding of LIV Golf no longer aligned with its investment strategy, and it would stop making further equity infusions. But, PIF agreed to fund operations through the remainder of the 2026 season and committed to providing capital through a secured loan.
LIV Golf hired restructuring advisors, with Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher serving as restructuring counsel, AlixPartners as financial advisor – which transitioned later to include Orlofsky’s role as CRO – and Ducera Securities as investment banker. The company appointed Gene Davis and Jon Zinman, individuals with extensive restructuring experience, as independent directors to the debtors’ boards, Orlofsky said.
In the lead-up to bankruptcy, Ducera launched a marketing process, hoping to identify investors to fund a new iteration of LIV Golf under a more efficient operating model, known as LIV 2.0. The marketing process led to finding the proposed lead investor, BC Partners, which was willing to provide a large amount of the funds needed to sponsor the 2027 season and beyond. However, the funding is contingent on the consummation of a reorganization plan.
The Chapter 11 cases
On Tuesday, LIV Golf entered into the RSA with BC Partners and filed for Chapter 11, intending to move forward with a plan encompassing the underlying terms with “due haste,” according to Orlofsky.
BC Partners’ bid, which was the result of the prepetition marketing process, would facilitate a recapitalization by anchoring a USD 300m investment in LIV 2.0. The debtors and their advisors spent weeks discussing and negotiating the BC Partners bid before entering into the RSA. In addition to the bid itself, BC Partners has agreed to provide further supplemental financing to fund start-up costs associated with LIV 2.0.
The BC Partners RSA has milestones that require LIV Golf to file a motion seeking authority to assume the RSA within three days after the petition date and hold a hearing on the RSA assumption motion and the incremental BC Partners funding no later than 10 days after the petition date.
Importantly, the debtors need to have an RSA entered into between themselves, BC Partners, PIF, and a requisite number of players by no later than 35 days after the petition date. The RSA includes a break-up fee equal to 3% of BC Partners’ total agreed investment.
LIV Golf also negotiated DIP financing from PIF, with Orlofsky noting that the company could not pursue its proposed transaction without a DIP loan. He said the proposed DIP financing will allow for a smooth transition into bankruptcy, and it includes milestones that lay out an “aggressive yet achievable” timeline, with a target date for emergence in January 2027.
The DIP financing from PIF includes USD 49.6m in new money, as well as a roll-up of prepetition debt.
The advisors
